Connell, Five Years after: Labor\u27s Antitrust Exemption and the Scope of the Construction Industry Proviso to Section 8(e) by Smith, Robert W.
Catholic University Law Review
Volume 29
Issue 4 Summer 1980 Article 6
1980
Connell, Five Years after: Labor's Antitrust
Exemption and the Scope of the Construction
Industry Proviso to Section 8(e)
Robert W. Smith
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Catholic
University Law Review by an authorized administrator of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert W. Smith, Connell, Five Years after: Labor's Antitrust Exemption and the Scope of the Construction Industry Proviso to Section 8(e),
29 Cath. U. L. Rev. 799 (1980).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/6
COMMENTS
CONNELL, FIVE YEARS AFTER: LABOR'S
ANTITRUST EXEMPTION AND THE
SCOPE OF THE CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY PROVISO TO
SECTION 8(e)
The scope of organized labor's liability under the antitrust laws is a per-
plexing problem that continues to plague the courts.' Its solution demands
a reconciliation of often antithetical federal policies.2 The goal of antitrust
law is to protect society from the evils of monopoly power by promoting
competition; collective labor activity, however, is inherently anticompeti-
tive.3 Consequently, the courts must delicately balance an antitrust policy
promoting competition with a labor policy permitting unions to eliminate
competition over wages, hours, and working conditions through collective
bargaining.
Organized labor is protected from antitrust liability through limited ex-
emptions. The Clayton Act's statutory exemption applies to unilateral la-
bor activity.4 Activity between labor and non-labor groups is governed by
I. As early as 1894, a federal court held that the antitrust laws conferred jurisdiction to
enjoin a strike by the American Railway Union. United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724 (C.C.N.D.
Ill., 1894). The Supreme Court overturned this determination, but it upheld criminal con-
victions against union officials for violating an injunction and refused to rule on the general
applicability of the antitrust law to labor unions. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
2. See general, St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law, 62
VA. L. REV. 603, 630 (1976).
3. See F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
183 (1977). To achieve the goal of eliminating competition in the labor market, unions must
monopolize the supply of labor. Successful unions, therefore, have the potential for impos-
ing restraints affecting the cost of labor and ultimately the cost of production. Id See also
Cox, Labor andAntitrust Laws -a PreliminaryAnalysis, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 252, 254 (1955).
4. Ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976)). Section 6
states that "[niothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the exist-
ence and operation of labor organizations." Further, in § 20, the courts are prohibited from
enjoining a dispute "between an employer and employees.., growing out of the terms and
conditions of employment." Ch. 323, § 20, 38 Stat. 738 (1914) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §
52 (1976)). Samuel Gompers called these sections the "Magna Carta" of labor. See Kutler,
Labor, the Clayton Act and the Supreme Court, 3 LAB. HIST. 19, 21 (1962).
The Clayton Act prohibited the literal application of antitrust law to mere combinations
of union members. Such combinations were not restraints on trade; however, it did not
Catholic University Law Review
a judicially created body of law known as labor's nonstatutory exemption. 5
The boundaries of this second exemption have always been unclear. A
recent example of the difficult application of the nonstatutory exemption is
the Supreme Court's decision in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Lo-
cal 100.6 The Court found an antitrust violation when a union success-
fully picketed a nonunion general contractor to agree to restrict all
subcontracting work on a construction site to union employers.7
Connell sparked substantial speculation that the Court had narrowed
labor's antitrust exemption. 8 Moreover, the decision may have signifi-
cantly curtailed the construction industry's protections under section 8(e)
of the National Labor Relations Act.9 In the five years since Connell, the
courts and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) have not fully
agreed on its proper interpretation, but its antitrust ramifications have
been considerably less than expected. This comment will survey the deci-
sions rendered in the wake of Connell that concern the scope of labor's
exempt all peaceful concerted activities and collective bargaining. See United States v.
Brims, 272 U.S. 549 (1926); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
5. The labels "statutory" and "nonstatutory" are products of the federal courts. See,
e.g., Meatcutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (nonstatutory exemption); United States
v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941) (statutory exemption). The nonstatutory exemption rec-
ognizes that a proper accommodation between the policy favoring collective bargaining and
the policy favoring free market competition requires the exclusion of some union-employer
agreements from antitrust sanctions that are not expressly exempt in the statute.
6. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
7. Id at 635.
8. See, e.g., St. Antoine, supra note 1, at 630; Comment, Recent Developments in Labor
Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 436-59 (1976); Comment, The Supreme Court 1974 Term, 89
HARV. L. REV. 234-45 (1975); Note, Labor Union Subject to Antitrust Liability as well as
Unfair Labor Practice Remedies, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 271-88.
9. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976). Section 8(e) is an amendment to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act that makes it an unfair labor practice for a union and employer
to stop handling, using, selling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in products of any other
employer or to stop doing business with any other person. The construction industry, how-
ever, is exempted from this section by a proviso "relating to the contracting or the subcon-
tracting of work to be done" on a construction site. Id
The original National Labor Relations Act or Wagner Act was passed in 1935 and it
remains the basic federal labor statute. See Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-67, 171-90 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NLRA]. In order to lessen the
power of the unions, the Wagner Act was amended by the Labor Management Relations
Act, commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act, Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in
scattered sections of 18 & 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as LMRA]. The construction indus-
try's proviso was added by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, popularly
known as the Landrum-Griffin Act. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified in
scattered sections of 18 & 29 U.S.C. [hereinafter cited as LMRDA].
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antitrust exemption and the construction industry proviso to section 8(e) of
the NLRA.
I. LABOR-ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO CONNELL
Antitrust law has often been used to regulate union activity, especially
secondary boycotts. The scope of antitrust coverage, however, has varied
tremendously over the years. Congress and the Supreme Court have never
agreed at any given point in time on either the extent of labor's exemption
from antitrust law or the extent of permissible secondary activity under
labor laws. An analysis of these issues should, therefore, begin with an
historical presentation.
A. Traditional Antitrust and Organized Labor
The antitrust era began with the passage of the Sherman Act' ° in 1890.
Although the Act was probably intended to regulate only monopolistic
business practices and commercial restraints on trade,'' it was soon ap-
plied to labor activity in the famous Danbury Hatters case. 2 The Supreme
Court held a secondary boycott by the Hatters Union violative of the
Act.' 3 In response, Congress passed the Clayton Act's labor exemption to
the Sherman Act for peaceful concerted union activity.'" The Supreme
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
11. See E. BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT 3-54 (1930); A. MASON, ORGA-
NIZED LABOR 120-31 (1925); Emery, Labor Organizations and the Sherman Law, 20 J. POL.
ECON. 599 (1912).
12. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). In 1895, the Supreme Court had declined to
pass on the applicability of the antitrust law to labor. See note I supra. In Danbury Hatters,
however, the Court held that the Sherman Act prohibited a nationwide boycott against
products of a non-union hat manufacturer. 208 U.S. at 308-09. The United Hatters of
North America, seeking to organize a Connecticut manufacturer, struck a factory and urged
the public to boycott the manufacturer and all other persons who sold its hats. The Court
found the boycott of "all other persons" to be a secondary boycott forbidden by the Sher-
man Act's ban on obstructing the free flow of commerce. Id at 306.
13. Id at 293. Primary concerted activity is pressure on the company, one's direct em-
ployer, to refrain from doing something. Secondary activity is the application of economic
pressure against an employer with whom the union has no direct dispute to induce that
employer to cease doing business with another employer with whom the union does have a
dispute. See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION, AND BAR-
GAINING 240-73 (1st ed. 1976); St. Antoine, National Labor Policy. Reflections and Distor-
tions of Social Justice, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 535, 542-45 (1979).
14. The Act provides that:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and opera-
tion of labor. . . organizations,. . . or to forbid or restrain individual members of
such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor
shall such organizations . . . be held to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade under the antitrust laws.
1980]
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Court followed with a narrow interpretation of the "exemption" and con-
tinued to apply antitrust laws to union activity.
In Duplex Printing v. Deering,5 New York machinists participated in a
secondary boycott to support an attempt in Michigan to unionize a print-
ing press manufacturer. The Court found this action to be an illegal re-
straint of trade under the Sherman Act.' 6 The majority explained that
sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act protected only union activities be-
tween an employer and his employees, and did not encompass an attempt
to organize a new employer. 7 An influential dissenting opinion by Jus-
tice Brandeis reproached the Court for overriding congressional intent to
remove the federal courts from the adjudication of antitrust claims arising
from peaceful labor activities.' 8
Partially in response to the trend represented by Duplex Printing,'9 Con-
gress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act's 20 prohibition against the issu-
ance of injunctions in most labor disputes.2 ' Congress impliedly overruled
Duplex Printing by defining a labor dispute as "any controversy concern-
ing terms or conditions of employment . . . regardless of whether or not
the disputants stand in proximate relation of employer and employee.,
22
Thus, Norris-LaGuardia represented an indirect reaffirmation of the Clay-
Clayton Act, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976).
15. 254 U.S. 443 (1921). Duplex Printing involved a boycott by machinists working for
newspaper publishers in New York in support of an attempt by machinists in Michigan to
unionize a printing press manufacturer. The Michigan manufacturer was the only major
national printing-press manufacturer remaining unorganized. Through the boycott, the un-
ions were attempting to protect gains already made in the industry. Id at 462-63.
16. Id at 466. See note 13 supra.
17. Id at 478.
18. Id at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
19. The Court relied on Duplex Printing to find antitrust violations in subsequent cases
involving refusals by union members to handle goods or work on goods furnished by an-
other employer which the union was seeking to organize. See Bedford Cut Stone Co. v.
Stone Cutters, 274 U.S. 37 (1927) (striking down a union rule which forbade members to
work on non-union sites); United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922)
(a strike was violative of the antitrust laws because the union intended to restrain entry of
non-union products into the market).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1976) (peaceful strikes, picketing, and boycotts sheltered
against injunctions issued in federal courts at the employer's request).
21. As the Supreme Court has stated: "The underlying aim of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act was to restore the broad purpose which Congress thought it had formulated in the Clay-
ton Act but which was frustrated, so Congress believed, by unduly restrictive judicial con-
struction." United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 235-36 (1941). The Senate Judiciary
Committee Report explained that the Act's purpose was "to protect the rights of labor in the
same manner the Congress intended when it enacted the Clayton Act, which Act, by reason
of its construction and application by the Federal Court, is ineffectual to accomplish the
Congressional intent." S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976).
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ton Act's purpose of exempting peaceful labor activity regardless of its pri-
mary or secondary nature.
After Norris-LaGuardia, the Court's attitude toward labor's antitrust ex-
emption changed dramatically. For example, in Apex Hosiery v. Leader,23
the Court found that the Sherman Act was aimed only at commercial mar-
ket restrictions on competition and not at labor activities designed to elimi-
nate competition based on wages.24 In Apex Hosiery, a company's
resistance to a closed shop25 proposal resulted in the forceable seizure of a
plant by employees and a sit-down strike. The Court found no violation of
the Sherman Act in this primary labor activity. Moreover, the Court ac-
knowledged in dicta that labor unions inevitably restrain competition
among employees over the price of their services, but such actions are not
the kind of market restraint prohibited by the antitrust laws.2 6
In the term after Apex Hosiery the Court formally recognized labor's
antitrust exemption. In United States v. Hutcheson,27 the Court held that
sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, along with the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, should be read in tandem to determine whether union activity has
violated the antitrust laws.2' This interpretation created a genuine immu-
nity for peaceful union activities that included secondary boycotts in sup-
port of union organizing drives. In short, the Court protected a union
from liability under the antitrust laws so long as it acted in its own "self-
23. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
24. Chief Justice Stone explained that:
strikes or agreements not to work, entered into by laborers to compel employers to
yield to their demands, may restrict to some extent the power of employers who are
parties to the dispute to compete in the market with those not subject to such de-
mands .... [T~he mere fact of such restrictions on competition does not in itself
bring the parties to the agreement within the condemnation of the Sherman
Act. . . . Since, in order to render a labor combination effective it must eliminate
the competition from non-union made goods, an elimination of price competition
based on differences in labor standards is the objective of any national labor organ-
ization. But this effect on competition has not been considered to be the kind of
curtailment of price competition prohibited by the Sherman Act.
Id at 503-04 (citations ommitted).
25. The closed shop is a union security arrangement in which the employer agrees to
hire only members in good standing of the union. See R. GORMAN, supra note 13, at 640-
42. These arrangements were later outlawed by § 8(a)(3) of Taft-Hartley. 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(3) (1976).
26. 310 U.S. at 501.
27. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
28. Id at 226. Instead of relying on the Apex decision to determine whether the strike
and boycott were illegal restraints upon the product market, the Hutcheson Court looked to
the labor union exemption for peaceful concerted activities under the Clayton Act and § 4 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Court found that Congress intended to override the narrow
judicial reading of the Clayton Act with the passage of Norris-LaGuardia.
1980]
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",29interest and [did] not combine with non-labor groups.
Hutcheson decreased the importance of the Sherman Act in regulating
activities of organized labor. Nevertheless, the Court has subsequently
made clear that labor organizations lose their immunity when they com-
bine with non-labor groups to restrain trade. For example, in Allen Brad-
ley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW,3° the union joined in an agreement with various
New York City employers and manufacturers that prohibited businesses
outside the city from selling their products in New York unless they had
an agreement with the union. This arrangement was designed to maintain
jobs and high wages for the union, but it also created a sheltered market.
The Supreme Court held that the union had forfeited its antitrust immu-
nity because it aided a non-labor group in the creation of a business mo-
nopoly.3'
Allen Bradley has become the paradigm case on the limits of labor's
immunity from the antitrust laws. It established a "collusion exception" to
the broad immunity rule of Hutcheson.32 A violation of the Sherman Act
will be found when a boycott directly restrains competition in the business
market and is brought about by a combination of union and employers. In
such circumstances, Apex Hosiery does not apply because the union is not
acting alone.
The Hutcheson-Bradley doctrine remained unchallenged until the
Supreme Court decided the companion cases of United Mine Workers v.
Penningon33 and Almalgamated Meatcuters v. Jewel Tea Co.34 in 1965.
In Pennington, the United Mine Workers and the major coal producers
conspired to drive smaller, less efficient operators out of business by estab-
lishing a uniform industry-wide wage rate higher than the smaller produ-
cers could afford. The union could not rely on Hutcheson because it had
not acted alone. Nevertheless, since the limit on competition was based on
a uniform wage rate, the disputed activity involved only the labor market
29. Id at 232. Four years later, the Court held that a union could engage in a secon-
dary boycott even if it had a destructive impact on the employer's business. Hunt v.
Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945).
30. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
31. Id at 810.
32. See E. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 185. Congress had reaffirmed
labor's exemption from the antitrust laws during enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.
The original House version of the Act would have subjected unions to antitrust liability, but
those provisions were deleted by the Conference Committee. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510,
80th Cong., Ist Sess. 65 (1947), reprinted in [1947] U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 1135.
Nevertheless, Taft-Hartley made unlawful certain secondary labor activities and allowed
private recovery of damages. 29 U.S.C §§ 160(0, 187 (1976).
33. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
34. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
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